


Important background information: A very brief chronology of events.

- Going back more than 10 years, regarding Hout Bay Neighbourhood Watch Area security initiatives, it was clear then, after many coordinated meetings with security role players that without a consistent, long-term, guaranteed income stream many key security elements that is considered essential for effective security in the area would simply not become a reality.
- Thus establishment of an SRA for the area was first communicated to all in the neighbourhood in August 2010. Oakwood Trustees made it clear to HOA members at that time that they would “vehemently oppose the SRA proposal”. Needless to say, the SRA (and another Valley-wide security initiative, the HBJSA) was not established.
- The result of this was that only 30 homes out of 159 in Meadows/Hughenden (Excluding Oakwood Estate) regularly contributed various amounts towards HB Neighbourhood Watch security initiatives. By August 2016, there was R110, 000.00 in the area account. A hopelessly inadequate amount to implement critically needed security elements. It was only enough to pay for the repair of a few broken CCTV cameras (that had reached the end of their working life) and to buy a few new cameras to cover areas that were rated as ‘high crime’ areas.
- On 14 June 2016 the HB Neighbourhood Watch Area Leader, Fred Nebe, circulated a notice to all to nominate a new area leader and new area committee. Oakwood Estate was included in this (See attachment “Invitation to Nominate”). Please note that the entire committee had to agree to the allocation of resources. This would obviously be done based on a well-developed and approved neighbourhood security plan. (See attachment “HMNW Protection Plan 2016 2017”). This plan was developed by a duly elected security committee, of which I was one member. The plan was developed by using the internationally recognized “Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems” (or PPS), which is considered a ‘world best’ model for neighbourhood security. The condensed version of the plan was distributed to all in the neighbourhood, including twice on Oakwood WhatsApp Chat.
- Hout Bay Valley Security Planning Workshop – 2 July 2016: This intensive workshop was facilitated by an external professional facilitator. All security role-players in all areas were invited to attend. I attended on behalf of Oakwood Estate and Norman Brook attended as Area Leader for Oakwood/Meadows/Hughenden. (See attachment Hout bay valley Security Planning Workshop” – specifically pages 6, 8 and 10 as well as other highlighted sections.
- Refer to the Oakwood Estate Blog: <http://www.oakwoodestate.co.za/blog/> - specifically points 2 and 3, where the HBCIA and SRA are supported by the Chairman and attention is drawn to the area security plan.

- **Due Process:** was definitely followed all along the path to the point that we have reached now;
- As elected Security Trustee I served and led the area security committee to develop an area security plan, based on an internationally accepted security standard.
- Throughout the processes that I was involved in, on behalf of Oakwood Estate, I provided feedback to the Trustees via email and WhatsApp as well as to the HOA members, where information were immediately applicable.
- The fact that a permanent, sustainable income stream was only viable through the establishment of an SRA was mentioned numerous times.
- This Security Standard (PPS) (condensed version) was distributed to all HOA residents on at least two occasions via the Chat WhatsApp group. Attention to it is also drawn in the Oakwood Blog on the Internet.
- On the 30th of November 2017, the Hout Bay Community Improvement Association (HBCIA) was formally launched. I attended the meeting on behalf of Oakwood Estate as well as the Oakwood HOA Chairman, Richard Marshall. (See attached PowerPoint Presentation – specifically page 8, where Estates and the SRA is outlined). The vision, mission, objectives and goals for the entire Valley was outlined and discussed in great detail.
- A public meeting, to discuss the proposed SRA/CID, was advertised widely throughout the neighbourhood. Everybody who had an interest in it was welcome to attend. The attendance register shows zero attendance from Oakwood residents. (See annexure OHM CID Notice of Public Meeting
- There is absolutely **no basis** to suggest that “due process” was not followed.




Who gave the authority for Oakwood Estate to be included in the SRA/CID?

Hughenden/Meadows/Bokkemannskloof/Overkloof form part of Area 8 of the official Hout Bay Neighbourhood Watch structure. The Executive of the HBNW gave the instruction that SRA's should be established in all areas. Norman Brook's mandate to proceed and include Oakwood Estate therefore came directly from the HBNW Executive.

For effective security, it is critical to understand and follow the processes in the framework below. Please focus, for this exercise, on the middle, green section.

Design and Evaluation Process Outline (DEPO)




Physical Protection Systems: Design

1. **Detection:** Effective detection consists of a variety of devices (including Thermal Imaging Cameras, CCTV, optical beams, etc.), set up in such a way as to give adequate advance warning of threat activity. The security principle is: “detect as far away from the target as possible”. In this way, the further detection takes place from Oakwood Estate perimeters, the better. We cannot do this on our own; we have to work closely together with our neighbouring areas. Detection should also be automatic (e.g. through “Verifier”, which means a cost per camera per day, for this service). As intruder pathways shift with crime patterns, so the equipment must be shifted to accommodate new pathways and tactics. Obviously the equipment must be replaced regularly and also serviced by specialist personnel. Detection is always done through a properly equipped Joint Operations Centre, staffed by trained personnel, who can coordinate response force tactics.
2. **Delay:** (in the security and other plans, reference is made of “beautifying the area” – there is a security principle called “CPTED” (or Cepted) meaning, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. This will be used in the

“Delay” element of the plan. Delay is intended to slow down the attack or escape speed of intruders and plays a fundamental role in the overall security plan. Obviously, equipment, ranging from concrete slabs, to tar poles, to numerous other devices have to be purchased, installed and maintained (and moved to new locations if necessary).

3. **Response:** Usually takes place via 3 elements; contracted forces, own forces or a combination of contracted and own forces. Due to the violent nature and numbers of intruders in our area, it is not advisable to use “own forces” (meaning ordinary HBNW members). The Valley simply has to employ tactical teams; as finances allow, first one (men, trained in close quarters combat, with vehicles, communications equipment and other equipment required to accomplish the mission, e.g. night sight binoculars).

Adversary and PPS Timelines



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The key to successful neutralization of an attack is:

- Early detection and short assessment time
- Rapid response force time to reach the target and neutralise the attack.
- Note: if adversary task time is shorter than response force time, the intruders will win every time.
- To achieve the above, the Joint Operations Centre, the Operations Commander and Tactical teams on the ground must be well trained and in

constant communication. The Operations Commander must at all times have full view of the area where the operation is conducted, e.g. there must be no “gaps” in the CCTV and other information systems – it has to be seamless, meaning, neighbourhoods will have to work together.

		Number of Adversaries					
		1	2	3	4	5	6
Number of Response Force Members	1	0.500	0.165	0.042	0.007	0.001	0.000
	2	0.835	0.500	0.225	0.079	0.024	0.006
	3	0.958	0.775	0.500	0.260	0.112	0.040
	4	0.993	0.921	0.740	0.500	0.285	0.139
	5	0.999	0.976	0.888	0.715	0.500	0.303
	6	1.000	0.994	0.960	0.861	0.697	0.500
	7	1.000	0.999	0.987	0.943	0.839	0.683
	8	1.000	1.000	0.996	0.978	0.926	0.821
	9	1.000	1.000	0.999	0.993	0.968	0.910
	10	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.998	0.988	0.958
	11	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.996	0.982
	12	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.993
	13	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.998
	14	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	15	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	16	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	17	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	18	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	19	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000

Probability of Neutralization Assuming All Response Forces Arrive at One Time and Both Sides Are Equally Matched in Terms of Weapons, Training, and Other Factors.

The number of attackers Oakwood usually has to fend off is 4. This means that a response force of 11 persons is required to neutralise the attack.

In Summary:

- SAPS is under resourced and there is no indication that in the short to medium term this situation will change. Many nights they only have one vehicle on patrol, with a response time of 2.5 hours.
- SAPS confirmed that in 2017, 39 house burglaries (with occupants inside) took place in Hout Bay alone in “security estates”. The rationale from the burglars is that home owners are at ease; have little or no detection equipment in place and trust the “trustees” to secure the perimeter.
- ADT/Fidelity and other alarm monitoring and armed response units is not equipped to neutralise attacks from groups of up to four or more intruders. Their task is to ensure that their client/s is safe in their own home; not to scour the mountainside, searching for intruders.

Conclusion

In order to make a meaningful and long term difference to the security situation in Hout Bay, a funding model is necessary that will guarantee a specific amount of income per month. (see business plans attached for more detailed information).

What we have to have in the shortest time possible is this:

1. A Joint Operations Centre (JOC), staffed by professionals, with the correct communication and monitoring equipment.
2. Replacement of outdated/dysfunctional equipment and installation of new equipment in areas that have been identified as “high crime” areas.
3. To begin with, one, but grown to three or four tactical task teams that has the training, mandate, procedures and equipment to intercept the intruders.
4. The ability to collect important data and analyse it in order to design preventive measures.

Last word:

There is no way to achieve any of the above objectives if an SRA/CID isn't established in each HBNW area. The system (detection/JOC/task team) cannot work on a ‘volunteer’ basis, where variable amounts of money are available month to month. It has to become a professional system, with proper governance processes and annual auditing, AGM's, feedback to members, etc. Oakwood can nominate one of its own HOA members to serve on the SRA so as to ensure that funds are spent correctly.

What Oakwood homeowners must also realise, is that there will be a financial offset for them from the SRA/CID. In the near future we will have to replace equipment, for which special levies will be required; there is a good possibility that we can get the SRA/CID to pay for it. Monitoring of our equipment (off site/automatically) is a critical following component – we can get the SRA/CID to pay for it as they need this information/data for their operational purposes.

Finally, there is no way that I personally will accept a situation where the “Estate” decides to “opt out” of this arrangement. Nobody will speak on my behalf in this matter. Each household must be allowed to make their own decision as to their participation or not.

We will regret it if the SRA/CID is not established, because then it will just be “business as usual”, ineffective, dangerous, inadequate, with the intruders winning every time.

Please ensure that you read/understand all of the above and build whatever elements you deem necessary into communication with HOA members.

Regards

Heinrich Brumfield

5 Grotto Way

Hout Bay